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THE SELF-DECEIVING STATE 
Robert Chambers 
'Oh what a goodly outside falsehood hath' Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice 
THE CONTEXT 
Accelerating Change 
In all history there has never been a period as dramatic 
for the scale and scope of unexpected changes in the 
human condition as the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Among the less obvious of these changes have been 
those in the realities of rural life and conditions in the 
South. But changes there also appear to be accelerating. 
The revolution in communications is increasingly 
touching rural people: in some parts of the South, not 
just radios, bu t television and videos are to be found in 
villages. In some economies, urban-style consumer 
goods are more and more demanded and available. In 
others, war, civil disorder, drought and famine have 
driven people dramatically down into destitution. 
Almost everywhere, in different ways, and in different 
directions, change — often rapid, often unpredictable 
— seems increasingly the norm. 
At the same time, though slower, less striking and less 
obvious, there have been steady shifts of view of the 
ends and means of development and of the role of the 
State. Three clusters of view can be distinguished 
(Chambers 1991): neo-Fabian, neo-Liberal, and third, 
an ideology of reversals of the normal. The neo-Fabian 
ideology, which gave the State a major direct role in 
development, is a survival f rom the 1970s and earlier; 
the neo-Liberal is a creature of the 1980s; and the third 
ideology has been evolving and coalescing over a long 
period, but gaining support and coherence in the 1980s. 
The normative thrusts and themes of this third 
ideology or paradigm include: 
— putting people before things, and poor people first; 
— development through learning process rather than 
blueprint; 
— decentralization, democracy, and diversity (to 
value local knowledge, participation and small 
group and community action); 
— open and effective communications and access. 
What is especially new is the value placed on adaptive 
and iterative rather than linear processes, on learning 
and changing rather than implementing a set plan, on 
differentness, on empowering local groups, and on 
demand from below. 
Normal Professionalism and Bureaucracy 
While these ideas gain currency especially amo 
intellectuals and non-government organizari. 
(NGOs) , two inert masses maintain the status quo, a 
insulate decision-making elites f rom the changing ru 
realities. 
The first is normal professionalism — the idc 
thinking, methods and behaviour dominant 
professions. Normal professionalism reproduces it* 
through hierarchical learning, university curricula a 
examinations, textbooks written by middle-ar 
academics, mostly men, professional societies, jour: 
editors, and the traditions and rewards of governmi 
departments into which graduates pass after univers 
and college. It values things more than peop 
numbers more than judgements, high technology mi 
than low, and whatever is urban, industrial, clean a 
hard more than whatever is rural, agricultural, dii 
and soft. 
The second is normal bureaucracy, meaning I 
characteristics of large, especially government, orga: 
zations. Normal bureaucracy reproduces itself in i 
Weberian idiom as professionals climb the ladders 
hierarchy by conforming to convention, avoiding err 
and abjuring innovation. Normal bureaucracy valu 
central authority, control, standardization, regulari; 
conformity, and quantitative targets. 
Normal professionalism and normal bureaucracy £ 
antithetical to the new views of development. In ti 
State, they combine to resist the new paradigm. Amo 
rural development professionals, though, some chanr 
are slowly occurring. These are reflected in t 
burgeoning literature on local knowledge (a' 
described as indigenous technical knowledi. 
indigenous agricultural knowledge, rural people 
knowledge . . .), on development alternatives, on t 
N G O sector, on gender, on the environment, and 
people's participation. 
In contrast, normal government development burea 
cracy appears resiliently static, robustly buffen 
against change. Yet major changes are implied by ai 
required for the new approaches to development. T: 
challenge with such bureaucracy is to find points 
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leverage for change. The search for means of 
bureaucratic reorientation is not a new enterprise (see 
e.g. Korten and Alfonso 1981). But two aspects of 
bureaucracy have been relatively neglected: standardi-
zation, and false feedback. In search of explanation and 
prescription, this paper analyses these in some of their 
manifestations, drawing examples from Indian field 
bureaucracy. 
Administrative Stasis 
Indian field bureaucracy does change in the 
programmes which it carries out. The steady flow of 
books by retired administrators about rural develop-
ment in India during their lifetimes makes this clear. In 
devising and promulgating programmes there has been 
imagination and inventiveness. Special programme has 
followed special programme — for different types of-
disadvantaged district, for different types of dis-
advantaged person, for the development of water and 
wastelands, for social forestry, seasonal employment, 
credit, productive assets for the poor, midday meals for 
school children, housing for vulnerable groups, adult 
literacy, and much else. 
At the same time Indian field bureaucracy changes 
little in its s tructure and norms. These reproduce 
themselves. Innovations are absorbed and transformed 
with reversion to type. The same District Admini-
stration headed by a Collector or Magistrate, and with a 
hierarchy of Block Development Officers and lower 
staff, implements many of the programmes. Planning is 
top-down. Ideas are conceived in Delhi or in the State 
capitals and promulgated as instructions with funds to 
be disbursed and targets to be achieved. Districts and 
Blocks are told what to do. Whatever the programme, 
the style is the same, or becomes the same. One 
programme, D W C R A , for women's employment, was 
initiated in the early 1980s with a planning workshop in 
Delhi. It was agreed unanimously that no targets 
should be set; but within a year targets were there. I t is 
as though there is a top-down magnetic field in which 
individual magnets cannot be turned around. The 
central conception is standardized and transmitted 
through the field for peripheral implementation, with 
targets set at each level. What is to be done can change; 
but how it is to be done is determined by a dutiful 
homeostasis. 
The stable continuity of Indian administration, can be 
partly understood in terms of three pervasive aspects: 
culture, conservatism and corruption. Cultural 
dimensions appear significant. Hierarchy is a deep 
structure in Indian culture, thought and behaviour. 
Linked with this, the Hindu concept of dharma, or 
'duty ' , is a strong force. Stanley Heginbotham's 
observations 15 years ago still apply, notably at the 
lower levels of administration: 
. . . the dharmic tradition provides its adherents with 
a set of norms relating to work that differ in many 
important ways f rom the norms of a growth-and 
change-oriented society. I t does not prepare an 
individual for situations of work overload. The 
concept of setting priorities is a foreign one, as is the 
notion of calculating costs and benefits in order to 
determine optimal work strategies. One does not 
strive to achieve results, nor does one feel concern if 
the performance of one's duty produces what 
appear to be undesired consequences. One keeps to 
established procedures and standards — neither 
seeking innovations nor quality of work that exceeds 
the traditional system-maintaining norms. 
(Heginbotham 1975: 34) 
Hierarchy and the dharmic tradition reinforce the 
second aspect, the conservatism found at the lower 
levels of most bureaucracies. A preference is shown for 
behaviour which is correct and approved. Rules and 
procedures may be bent or used in ways not intended, 
but the outward form is respected, giving a sort of 
liturgical pleasure to those who master its sequences 
and observances, even when it is exploited for private 
rents. Procedures tend to be additive: new ones are 
superimposed upon old. Rules and lists tend to be for 
ever, reproduced more or less faithfully, unless there is 
strong reason to change them; and when there is reason 
to change, adding and patching are preferred to 
abolition or restructuring. 
The third factor is corruption. This includes informal 
fees, division of spoils, and the transfer trade. Informal 
fees for services rendered vary by region but are 
sometimes almost formal — with a well known and well 
understood fee for obtaining a form, registering a land 
title, and so on. Division of spoils f rom kickbacks 
reportedly follows well established 'bureaucratic' 
norms, with set percentages f rom contracts and other 
illicit monies which are distributed as rents to different 
officers, especially at the lower levels. At higher levels, 
as analysed by Wade (1984) and corroborated by 
articles in the press, the transfer trade is widespread. 
Officials buy posts f rom the politicians who control 
them. Partly in consequence, the frequency of transfer 
from post to post 'is typically so high as to make 
difficult any engagement between the official and his 
particular responsibilities' {ibid). There are officers 
who courageously stand out against this system. But 
generally, in these circumstances, there is little 
incentive or opportunity for an official to institute 
reforms. Indeed, where they do so, a penal posting can 
be the prompt reward: Arun Bhatia, the Collector of 
Dhule District in Maharashtra who exposed corruption 
in the Employment Guarantee Scheme was quickly 
given the opportunity to exercise his talents as officer in 
charge of the Maharashtra Government 's filing system. 
The transfer trade is a slipping clutch in development, 
oiled by money and preventing engagement and 
effective drive. 
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The effects are conservative. Lower-level staff have a 
strong financial stake in the status quo. An analysis of 
who would gain and who lose f rom reforms in 
groundwater exploitation and in forestry has suggested 
that almost any reform would reduce their incomes 
(Chambers, Saxena and Shah 1989: 232). For their 
part, middle-level and senior officers involved in the 
transfer trade need to recover the outlays and redeem 
the commitments made to obtain their posts, and to 
make a profit. If they threaten vested interests, or stay 
outside the system, they are vulnerable to transfer to 
penal postings or backwaters. The incentives and 
disincentives of the system make it a model of 
sustainability. 
Fordism: the 'Model T Mode 
Culture, conservatism and corruption reinforce the 
top-down tendencies found also in other field 
bureaucracies. Hierarchical culture resonates with 
normal bureaucratic culture. Conservatism maintains 
central authority. Corruption presents incentives for 
rules which inconvenience the public and create 
leverage for rent-seeking officials. There are then 
cultural, procedural and personal reasons for centralized 
insensitivity. 
This permits another phenomenon, the promotion of 
standardized development packages. This has been 
described as 'Fordist ' . The term 'Fordist ' refers to 
mass batch production as an industrial process 
associated with Henry Ford the First, and epitomized 
in his supposed remark that Americans could have their 
Model T Ford any colour they liked as long as it was 
black. Bureaucratic, top-down development is similarly 
standardized and driven by supply. A Fordist or 
'Model T approach has been common in Indian rural 
development: in the early green revolution in 
Northwest India you could, as it were, plant any wheat 
you liked as long as it was the new HYV Sonora; in 
social forestry, at one time, you could plant any tree you 
liked as long as it was eucalyptus; in parts of the 
Gangetic plains you could have any public tubewelJ 
you liked as long as it was a World Bank tubewell. 
To understand this 'Model T ' phenomenon better, let 
us examine four other examples of Indian rural 
development programmes: the Training and Visit 
(T and V) system of agricultural extension; the 
w a r a b a n d i system of water distribution on canal 
irrigation; watershed development; and the Integrated 
Rural Development Programme (IRDP). 
First, the Training and Visit system represented an 
attempt at bold and radical change. Earlier, agricultural 
extension was undertaken by Village Level Workers 
(VLWs) responsible not only to the Department or 
Ministry of Agriculture, but also to other departments. 
VLWs were often expected to implement an impossible 
number and variety of programmes. They wer> 
overwhelmed and buried under geological layers 01 
instructions f rom different masters. Reportin: 
requirements alone took much of their time. T and \ 
was a management system (Benor and Harrison 1977 
Benor et al 1984) which sough* to make ther 
responsible only for agriculture and only to oni 
department , to programme their work so that thei" 
supervisors would know each day where they were am 
what they were doing, and to institute regular meeting 
and training. They were to propagate and popularizi 
appropriate packages of practices through contac 
farmers, who would be in touch with other non-contac 
farmers. 
T and V was introduced in most Indian states. Muci 
evidence suggested that the reality was far from th< 
theory (see e.g. Moore 1984, 1986; Howell 1988 
Common weaknesses were that extension staff ir 
practice often continued to have many responsibilities 
that good extension recommendations were often no 
available f rom research; and that standard package-
were not sensible for the diverse and difficul 
conditions of much Indian farming. By the late 1980 
promotion had given way to post-mortem as thi 
dominant style of discussions of T and V, which wa-
more and more spoken of in the past tense. 
T h e second example is the w a r a b a n d i system of canai 
irrigation water distribution. This entails timed turn? 
for farmers to take water (for a fuller account sec 
Chambers 1988a: 92-99). W a r a b a n d i is successfully 
practised in Northwest India where four conditions are 
met: water is scarce and rainfall low; landholdings are 
consolidated with clear ownership; channels lead to 
individual fields; and a constant flow can physically be 
assured through the outlet which supplies a group o' 
farmers. In these conditions, farmers will accept timec 
turns proportional to their land, and will irrigate ai 
night. These conditions are, however, rare in India 
outside the Northwest. But this did not deter thc 
Seventh Five Year Plan from setting a target o; 
8 million hectares to be brought under new waraband: 
during the plan period (GOI 1985: 96). 
Attempts were dutifully made to introduce the 
w a r a b a n d i blueprint rapidly into widely differing 
environments. But since the necessary precondition? 
rarely existed, the outcome was almost universal 
failure. Boards giving names and times for taking watei 
were erected on canals; but they were a facade. Almosi 
everywhere, farmers ignored them. They can be found 
standing there still, relics for future bureaucratic 
archeologists, with rust and fading paint giving the lie 
to official fantasy. 
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Watershed management provides a third case of top-
down standardization. Mount ing concerns about 
deforestation, erosion, siitation, the drying up of 
springs, and other forms of environmental degradation 
led in the 1980s to a strong drive for watershed 
development and management. In at least 40 pilot 
watersheds, treatments were undertaken, leading to 
scaling up and a momentum for much larger 
programmes, some with World Bank support. In the 
scaled up programmes, if not in the pilot projects, 
treatments were standardized. Professionally, the 
approach was that of engineers. Works were of set 
designs, and often constructed in the field without 
regard for local topography, let alone farmers' 
knowledge, technology or wishes. Physical and 
disbursement targets were set, and despite a rhetoric of 
participation, implementation was top-down. 
An example is the Maheshwaram watershed near 
Hyderabad. There the uniform treatments changed 
over the years, but not the style. Contour earth bunds 
were standard at first, but then varied and replaced by 
vegetative bunds of khus grass (Ve t ive r i a 
z izan io ides ) , a technology promoted with enthusiastic 
World Bank support over large and diverse areas of 
India, and indeed of the world. A special study of the 
Maheshwaram programme (Sitapathi Rao et al 1989) 
found many shortcomings, and stated that: 
. . . what is being done as part of soil and water 
conservation activity . . . appears to be execution of 
these measures as per a set pattern, to achieve the 
target coverage. The anxiety of the field staff could 
be seen in their efforts to achieve the targets, as this 
is the only point of discussion in the monthly and 
quarterly review. The scope for any initiative at the 
field level to observe and modify the activities is 
very much restricted because of the regimented 
approach. 
(ibid: 59) 
T h e study also found lack of consultation and 
participation, ploughing in of bunds by dissatisfied 
farmers who never wanted them in the first place, 
erosion actually resulting from anti-erosion bunds, and 
cause for doubt about the universal efficacy of khus 
grass. Nevertheless, the Government proceeded with 
plans for massive expansion of watershed programmes 
during the following (Eighth) Plan period. 
The fourth example is the Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Programme ( IRDP) . This vast programme seeks 
through subsidized credit to provide families who are 
below the poverty line with income-earning assets 
which will enable them to move above the poverty line. 
Each administrative Block has had an annual target of 
600 households to receive loans and assets. This target 
presents a considerable administrative strain. Lists are 
meant to be drawn up of households below the poverty 
line, ana enterprises identified for them to undertake. 
These, one might expect, would have to be quite varied 
in any environment, in order to exploit different 
economic niches. But in practice, the programme has 
tended to standardize, which makes it less demanding 
administratively and easier to routinize corruption. In 
consequence, certain enterprises have been over-
subscribed. Milch buffaloes have been the most 
common, although in several respects (lumpiness, risk, 
fodder requirements, dry periods with no income) they 
are unsuitable for very poor people. In a village of 143 
ho useholds in Uttar Pradesh, the pattern was different: 
of 26 I R D P loans, 12 were issued for 'shop-keeping', 
and another eight were issued by the same bank for the 
same purpose over the same period. Only four of the 
I R D P recipients had a 'shop' of any sort, and there was 
no scope for 20 shops in such a small village (pers comm 
Jean Dreze). 
Detailed village-level studies in a social anthropological 
mode (summarized in Dreze 1990) have shown the 
I R D P to have been, in most parts of India (the 
exception being West Bengal), an unusually bad 
programme. Corruption has been almost universal; the 
beneficiaries have often been the better off;- and poor 
people have quite often become poorer as a result of 
loans and loss of assets or failure of enterprises. Yet the 
I D R P remains the major thrust of the Government 's 
anti-poverty programme. 
In these four domains — agricultural extension, the 
distribution of canal irrigation water, watershed 
development, and the I R D P — the analogy between 
'Model T ' batch production and rural development 
packages holds quite well on the supply side, of what 
the factory or the bureaucracy provide. But the analogy 
breaks down on the side of the customer, client or 
beneficiary. T o survive, a factory must produce what 
people will buy: the market is the discipline. There is no 
comparable discipline with the State. When rural 
programmes do not fit what people need and want, it 
might be thought that those responsible for planning 
would learn and change. But this has happened only 
slowly. In the four cases I have discussed standardized 
rules of behaviour standard outputs continued to be the 
norm even when they worked badly or did not work at 
all. When there was feedback and change did occur, as 
with watershed programmes, the tendency was to 
switch f rom one standard prescription to another, 
rather than to add to the options. In psychologists' 
jargon, this is 'slot-rattling', keeping the same slots but 
putting different items in them, rather than changing 
the slots themselves. So some rural development 
remains stuck in the Fordist era of mass production. 
There is then a question to be answered. When field 
level realities suggest widespread misfit and failure, 
how is it that 'Model T ' programmes continue to be 
planned and implemented? There is something to 
explain. 
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PSYCHOSIS: THE SELF-DECEIVING STATE 
By anthropomorphic analogy, part of the explanation 
can be sought in how the State perceives reality. 
Human psvchosis can he defined as 'any form of severe 
mental disorder in which the individual's contact with 
reality becomes highly distorted'. In this sense, in the 
illustrations presented above the State can be described 
as psvchotic: its contact with reality is distorted; it does 
not respond to the misfit between intention and effect. 
The thesis of this article is that much of the explanation 
is to be found in false positive feedback, in 
misperceptions and misinformation. There are dangers 
here of exaggeration. In India, the Programme 
Evaluation Organization of the Planning Commission 
has a good track record with its investigations and 
reporting which some Northern countries could do 
well to emulate. The National Sample Survey has a well 
deserved 'international reputation for the quality of its 
work. But most of the time, for most field organizations 
and programmes, misinformation cloaks the truth: the 
misfit of 'Model T ' programmes is not seen. The 
Emperor, though naked, is reported by sources close to 
him to have clothes. 
How does this come about? 
False Positive Feedback 
False positive feedback is mediated in five main ways. 
These are misreporting; selected perception; methods 
which mislead; diplomatic prudence; and defences 
against dissonance. 
1 Misreporting 
Perhaps the most pervasive source of misleading 
positive feedback is misreporting. This is a syndrome of 
interactions between: 
— time-bound target-setting imposed top-down; 
— performance judged on the reported achievement 
of targets; 
— a punitive style of management; 
— an overload of reporting (making exact reporting 
impossible anyway); 
— corruption (so that there are facts to conceal or 
figures to change); 
— tacit connivance between levels in hierarchies; 
— knowledge that the 'Model T ' does not fit or does 
not work (leading to demoralization). 
When these combine, as thev often do, targets tend to 
be reported as achieved when they have not been, or at 
least performance is exaggerated. The remarks of a 
District Agricultural Officer to his subordinates in the 
early 1970s reflect conditions which still persist: 'We 
have achieved all our targets. Do you understand 
Make the necessary arrangements in your blocks'. I 
these circumstances, the achievement of target 
becomes 'a largely book-keeping affair' (Moo 
1974: 143). 
When, in this style of management, targets are raise 
annually, misreporting builds up misinformatio 
cumulatively. This occurred in India with annual! 
raised targets for areas under High-Yielding Varietii 
of rice. For 1972/3, officially reported figures for tl 
area under paddy HYVs in two t a l u k s (administratis 
areas) in Nor th Arcot District in Tamil Nadu were " 
and 48 per cent respectively, but a survey in 1 
representative villages in the two areas gave a figure < 
only 13 percent (Chambers and Wickremanayake 1977 
In one of the villages, the survey showed less tha 
50 per cent adoption, but the reports of the haple 
Village Level Worker had risen to 95 per cent, leavir. 
him nowhere to go, and a problem with how to conce 
the t ruth f rom visiting senior officers. A growin 
divergence between report and reality stresses tl 
reporter, who is then driven to make up t: 
appearances of reality in the cosmetic as well 
numerical sense. 
Especially where corruption is involved, misreportir 
takes the form of lies. Subsidies play a part here too. . 
practice subsidies support corruption, providing 
surplus which can be extracted as rents. Subsidize 
inputs (as in some agricultural extension) or assets (;. 
in the I R D P ) are also patronage for staff who can sha: 
them with some of those for whom they were ni 
intended. Reporting cannot, however, reveal this, 
has to be falsified to conceal it. So when corruption 
endemic, so is false reporting. Work is reported dor 
which has not been done, and workers paid who hav 
not been paid. Costs are inflated. In one case in 19S 
this was by a factor of four: a Forest Department w. 
accounting a cost of Rs40 per running metre ( 
protective stone walling, when an N G O working on th 
ground found the cost to be only RslO. Or agair 
administrators receive figures which they know a: 
already false, and are then ordered by politicians ; 
falsify them further . In one technical department, th 
annual meeting of some 500 senior staff is said to ha\ 
been confronted by their Chief Statistical Officer wh 
asked: 'Why do you all lie?' There was no reply. TI 
question was repeated. 'There was still no reply. 
2 Selected perception 
A second origin of misleading positive feedback 
special and unrepresentative sources of informatio 
Two phenomena interlink here: islands of salvatie 
and rural development tourism. 
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Islands of salvation are villages, areas or projects which 
have received special treatment. To an astonishing 
degree, a single village or project can be quoted and 
- requoted back and forth at conferences and in papers 
without any analysis of its atypicality. One village, 
Ralegaon Shindi, in Maharashtra, has been repeatedly 
cited as a model for sustainable environmental 
management, although accounts agree that it has most 
exceptional and unusual leadership; and it would seem 
that it has never been replicated. One canal irrigation 
cooperative, the Mohini Water Cooperative Society, 
the recipient of extraordinarily privileged treatment 
from Government, has been the source of a myth 
accepted both by the Planning Commission in India 
(GOI 1985: II : 82) and by authorities outside India. 
This is that, to quote one, ' In Gujarat State in India, 
the irrigation agency sells water volumetrically in bulk 
to cooperatives, which distribute it and collect fees 
from their members' (Repetto 1986: 33); in fact, 
Mohini was probably almost or entirely alone in this 
respect, and the myth of water cooperatives in Gujarat 
had a capacity to spread not shared by the institution 
itself (Chambers 1988: 59-62). Or take T and V. When 
T and V was pioneered in India in the Chambal 
Command Area, it achieved 'apparently astonishing 
success', but this could be attributed to the 'pilot 
project effect' — because the World Bank was 
intensively involved, staff were therefore motivated, 
and irrigation and input supplies arrived on time 
(Moore 1984:306-7). Specially nurtured and protected, 
islands of salvation like these systematically mislead. 
Rural development tourism — the brief rural visit by 
the urban-based senior officer — reinforces the island 
of salvation effect, being often directed to special places 
and people. Visits by senior officers are usually planned 
and orchestrated by local-level staff to ensure carefully 
selected perception. Nationally renowned islands of 
salvation are favourites for visits by VVIPs. At a more 
humble level, Block development staff often have a 
special village, and special ' tame' people in that village, 
to solve the problem of how to mislead visitors. Rural 
development tourism has other built-in biases against 
perception of poverty and meeting poor people 
(Chambers 1983: 10-25). In agricultural extension, 
farmers are rehearsed in the answers they are to give; 
and the resource-rich farmer (known variously as a 
master, model, demonstration, progressive, or contact, 
farmer) who is visited can show the package of practices 
in the field before presenting the visitor's book to be 
signed. In canal irrigation, a w a r a b a n d i committee is 
mustered, though it only exists when visitors come. In 
watershed development, the area visited in the 
watershed follows the road along the top of a ridge 
where erosion created by bad conservation works are 
not to be seen. Experienced staff package their tours for 
visitors, and in one case had a 'two hour treatment ' , and 
a 'four hour treatment' . In the IRDP, the same poor 
person with the milch buffalo is shown off to a 
succession of visitors to the village, and has been 
carefully coached and supported by staff to ensure an 
impression of dutiful success. Only the best is shown 
and seen. Worse, the more senior and influential the 
visitor, the more elaborate the preparations, and the 
more biased the impressions. The glowing words of the 
VIP in the visitor's book then reflect not the wider 
reality, but the skill and care with which the visit was 
managed. 
3 Methods which mislead 
A third source of positive bias can be found in the 
methods used for monitoring, evaluation, research and 
other investigation. Of these, the most common is the 
questionnaire survey. 
Questionnaire surveys are vulnerable to a host of 
distortions, and especially to overfavourable 
impressions of the achievements of government 
programmes. Three examples — from agricultural 
extension, watershed development, and the I R D P — 
can serve as illustrations. 
For agricultural extension, one survey conducted in 
Hambantota District, Sri Lanka, found that 62 per cent 
of farmers said they had been visited by extension 
workers in a single season, while a more careful survey 
found only 16 per cent and that over two seasons 
(Chambers and Wickremanayake 1977: 158-9). T h e 
first figure was absurd, and the second still most 
improbably high. 
For watershed development, a questionnaire survey 
reported that only one farmer out of272 (or 0.4 per cent 
of farmers) interviewed was cross ploughing (a practice 
frowned on by agricultural extension) while questions 
posed after group discussions yielded 28 per cent (a 
figure suggested by field observation to be closer to 
reality) (pers. comm. C. Sitapathi Rao). 
For the IRDP, Dreze's (1990) persuasive analysis has 
shown that a greatly inflated impression of success was 
given by the methods used in evaluations. Among 
these, one was a question to beneficiaries (who were all 
meant to be initially below the poverty line, but who 
often were not) as to whether they had been below the 
poverty line three years earlier when they joined the 
programme. Not surprisingly, positive responses were 
high, over 85 per cent, a figure suggested by other 
evidence to be far wide of the mark. 
In these three examples, there was overfavourable 
distortion of the reality. The strongest explanations are 
that informants knew what the 'right' answer was, and 
gave it, for reasons of prudence or deference; and that 
enumerators knew what responses were hoped for, and 
recorded them. When such distortions operate, 
positive responses to more general questions about the 
value of a programme have little credibility. 
36 
When such biases can occur, monitoring, evaluation 
and research data from questionnaire surveys about 
government programmes are open to challenge. One 
can ask, for example, what credence can be placed in 
the reported negative replies of farmers when asked if 
they have been visited by extension agents. A study of 
T and V extension impact in Nor thern India (Feder 
et al 1988: 82) examined T and V evaluation reports 
from seven states. The average percentages o f ' n o visits' 
from extension were 15 per cent for contact farmers, 
and 34.5 per cent for non-contact farmers (i.e. those 
meant to meet the contact farmers). The study 
concludes that 'The demand for T and V extension 
services as measured by non-contact farmers ' inter-
action with extension agents thus appears significant.' 
But since farmer respondents must have known that 
contact was meant to take place, a similar distortion 
could be expected to that with reported cross-
ploughing; it would seem likely that actual 'no visits' 
would be much larger than reported. On similar lines, 
other monitoring and evaluation data from 
questionnaires are open to queston for overfavourable 
methodological bias. 
4 Diplomacy and prudence 
The fourth source of positive bias is diplomatic 
prudence on the part of those engaged in research, 
monitoring, evaluation and consultancy. To put it 
bluntly, consultants and researchers do not want to bite 
the hand that feeds them. 
The World Bank in India commissioned research by a 
large consultancy organization to assess the impact of a 
policy the Bank was known to be keen to promote. This 
was the subdivision of c h a k s — the areas below outlets 
on canal irrigation systems — into 8 ha s u b c h a k s , and 
then the rotation of water between the s u b c h a k s . The 
consultants conducted the research and concluded that 
this preferred interventon led to benefits in higher 
yields, more uniform yields, and less lime taken to 
irrigate. The World Bank and the Indian Government 
adopted the policy. But a tiresome analysis (Chambers 
1988: 54-59) of the evidence in the report indicated that 
none of these conclusions was supported, and that 
another factor, a good water supply, was the key 
variable. It was difficult to avoid confirming the 
hypothesis that the consultants had produced the 
answer they knew was wanted. 
More widespread than such misinterpretation of data, 
is the more insidious self-censorship by those (and who 
is without guilt?) who conduct commissioned research. 
The conflicts will be familiar to some who read this. Do 
honest consultants who write the t ruth find it easier or 
harder to get further work? 
5 Defences against dissonance 
Even if bad news is reported, it may be avoided o 
rejected. In Ralph "Waldo Emerson's words 'Peopi 
only see what they are prepared to see.' 
On avoidance, independent researchers were one 
invited to a workshop at the World Bank to prese: 
their findings f rom field research on a World Ban 
supported project. These were negative compared wit 
a mid-term review. One staff member, who had take 
part in the mid-term review, came to the sessio: 
listened, was convinced, and said he regretted th 
errors. But other staff members who were also involve, 
did not come to the meeting. Whatever the reasons, a 
obvious conjecture is that they did not want to knov 
By not being present, they did not have to kno\ 
Avoidance worked. 
On rejection, in the case of the consultant's report citc 
above on subdivision of c h a k s and rotation of watt 
supplies, a meeting was called to discuss interpretatio 
of the data. T h e critic's points were half accepted b' 
then finessed into a sort of limbo. The misleadir. 
conclusions drawn by the consultants were then, f. 
from being rejected or modified, actually publishc 
unchanged, and without reference to the criticise 
(Chadha 1981). 
As defences, these five sources of self-deceptic-
interlink. Those who deceive know that those they a; 
deceiving know they are being deceived but also th: 
they want to be deceived in a way that does not sho-
that they know. So there is implicit connivance 
captured in the following personal communicatio 
(April 1992): 
IAS Officer: ' I said to my BDOs — you must eac 
have a VIP circuit. It is p a n of the game 
Question: ' D o the VIPs know that they are bein 
given this treatment? Do they know the 
are not getting the truth?' 
IAS Officer: 'They don't want to know. For them, . 
would only make trouble.' 
These five sources of misinformation are mutual, 
reinforcing. The flows of misleading positive feedbac 
to which they give rise are homeostatic — conservatr 
at the centre through misperception of the peripher 
They reinforce top-down reflexes. The single univers. 
solution when inspected on rural visits is seen to v. 
well; routine reports rarely damn; independe; 
evaluations confirm the impression; prudent re 
pondents, researchers, evaluators and consultar 
refrain from brutal honesty; and when bad news do 
get through, it may be rejected. So though loc 
conditions differ, evidence of misfits is filtered oi 
Positive misinformation props up standard pr 
grammes. Psychotic, the State deceives itself. 
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The Costs of Self-Deception and Error 
In India, the costs of self-deception are enormous. 
First, there are the direct financial costs in vast 
programmes of misdirected and unproductive agri-
cultural research and extension, of erroneous irrigation 
development, of blueprinted watershed development, 
and of the misjudged priorities of the IRDP. Second, 
there is the demoralization of field staff who find 
themselves required to extend advice, or negotiate and 
impose programmes, which people do not want and 
which do not make sense. Third, there is the alienation 
of the public, whose cynical realism about the State is 
reinforced. And for all these, there are the opportunity 
costs of foregoing the alternatives. Similar costs are 
likely in other countries, but cases will differ. 
Worldwide, the costs of past and present error are 
beyond any calculation. Large-scale investment for 
research and programmes to reduce post-harvest losses 
of grain at the village level can now be seen to have been 
based on a largely false premise. Nutrition programmes 
which heavily stressed protein rather than calories 
missed the mark. In environmental matters, mis-
diagnosis may be a special risk because of dogmatic 
convictions about the unknowable and the next decade 
may reveal gross error in some current conventional 
wisdom and prescriptions. For development policy and 
action generally, the question now is how to enable the 
State, and the development professions, to be closer in 
touch with reality. 
IN SEARCH OF THERAPY 
Reversals for Local Diversity 
With accelerating change, with, declining resources for 
development, and with widespread and often increasing 
deprivation, it matters more than ever for policy 
makers and professionals to be right about what is 
happening. The evidence and argument above suggest 
that the more top-down, supply-driven and standardized 
a programme package is, the more likely misleading 
positive feedback becomes. The converse is that the 
more bottom-up, demand drawn and diverse a 
programme is, the closer will be the fit between data 
and reality. The key is reversals of the normal, as in 
each of the four domains of rural development 
discussed above. 
In a g r i c u l t u r e , the change is f rom the T and V 
approach of transfer of technology (TOT), to what has 
been described as farmer participatory research 
(Farrington and Martin 1988) or ' farmer-first ' 
(Chambers, Pacey and Thrupp 1989). In the T O T 
mode, research priorities are decided by scientists; 
technology is developed by them on research stations 
and in laboratories; and recommended packages of 
practices are then passed to extension organizations for 
transfer to farmers. T O T has had successes with some 
green revolution agriculture where environments could 
be controlled for a uniform fit, but a poor record with 
rainfed agriculture which is more complex, diverse, ' 
and risk-prone. In the reversed, contrasting, farmer- j 
first mode, analysis is carried out more by farmers 
themselves; technology is developed and adapted more ; 
on farm and by farmers; baskets of choices for farmers 
replace packages of practices; and farmers' own 
capabilities are enhanced and experiments supported. 
Innovations in seed-breeding illustrate the shift f rom a .j 
top-down 'Model T ' approach. In the normal i l l 
professional mode in India, breeders make crosses, i | j 
screen lines for good characteristics such as disease I 
resistance and yield, and then select only a very few, 
perhaps two or three, out of as many as two hundred 
lines for assessment by a central committee. The j 
committee chooses material for multi-locational 
testing, following which those lines judged best are 
chosen, certified, and passed on for seed multiplication | 
as a stable, standard output , and then for Extension to 
transfer to farmers. Before 'adoption' , farmers play no 
part, and much promising genetic material is lost. In j 
contrast, D. M. Maurya (Maurya el al 1988; Maurya j 
1989) of the Narendra Deva University of Agriculture : j 
and Technology in Uttar Pradesh has been making a 
wider range of lines available directly to farmers for 
them to try out, on condition that if other farmers ask 
for seed, they will also give some back to him. Farmers ' 
thus have a wider choice, and themselves test, evaluate J 
and disseminate, for their diverse and particular j 
conditions. The package with a single seed has been j j 
replaced by a basket with choices. 
In c a n a l i r r i g a t i o n , two forms of reversal can be 
noted. The first is the participation of farmers in 
determining how they wish to distribute water among 
themselves. This has been the focus of much research ! !j 
and writing. The second is appraisal and analysis of i 
each irrigation project separately leading to operational 
plans which are tailor-made. In India this approach has 
been central to the National Water Management 
Project, and contrasts with the longer-standing 
Command Area Development Programme which has ; | 
sought to implement w a r a b a n d i and other standard j j 
measures over most large projects. 
; if 
In w a t e r s h e d d e v e l o p m e n t , the major reversal is to ij 
involve farmers themselves in appraisal, mapping, 
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation ft 
for the development of their watersheds (Mascarenhas j| 
1991; Shah et al 1991). Participatory evaluation has j|; 
been the most recent development ( S D C 1991). In late j 
1991, in a participatory evaluation involving farmers, jjt 
MYRADA (an N G O ) , the Drylands Development 
Board of Karnataka, and the Swiss Development 
Corporation, farmers were empowered to demonstrate 
and argue the merits of their own soil and water 
conservation works. Participatory appraisals in the 
Field were followed by farmers' presentations backed 
38 
up through showing and explaining slides of their fields 
and of alternative technologies, to senior officials in 
Bangalore. This led to Government agreement to 
modify its standard ( 'Model T ' ) soil conservation 
structures to benefit f rom farmers ' technology and to 
conform closer to farmers ' priorities (pers. comm. 
Mart in Somm^r). 
In a n t i - p o v e r t y p r o g r a m m e s , the major reversal is 
to allow poor people to choose w h e n they need 
support , by providing them with optional safety nets. 
T h e classic example is the Alaharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme, where the policy was that groups 
could demand as of right to be given work when they 
needed it, and to be paid a daily wage if work could not 
be provided. 
All four sets of reversals share common features. All 
allow for local diversity. All empower local people with 
choice. There is a shift f rom standardization to 
differentiation, from a package of practices to basket of 
choices, f rom the black 'Model T ' to the Toyota with its 
colour chosen by each client. Decision-making is 
decentralized to people with local knowledge and 
reasons to want it accurate. All sets of reversals make 
lateral links between people and knowledge and short-
circuit the vertical channels of communication which 
so often distort. All are thus therapeutic for the 
psychotic State. 
Rights, Communications and Empowerment 
Therapy often meets resistance in the patient. With the 
psychotic State, much of the resistance originates in the 
vested interests of politicians, officials and contractors. 
They often have personal and pecuniary interests in 
maintaining and exploiting the system through hiding 
or distorting information. 
Corruption and the extraction of rents are hidden bv 
falsifying or withholding information. Reports passed 
upwards conceal the pickings from construction and 
maintenance in canal irrigation and watershed 
development, or the routinized rents extracted from 
I R D P subsidized loans and purchases. Reports falsify 
statements of work completed, of prices paid, of people 
employed, of benefits disbursed, and of services 
rendered. 
Rents are levered f rom the public by withholding 
information, wilfully misleading, and spreading lies. In 
canal irrigation, this takes the form of not informing 
farmers about water supplies, even when they are 
known, and of pretending that water is scarcer than it 
is. When farmers are uncertain how much water is 
available, believe it is short, and do not know how much 
they will receive or when, they pay up in the hope of 
assuring themselves a supply. In social forestry, this 
can take the form of pretending to farmers that the 
cutting and transit of trees are prohibited when they an 
not. In ways such as these, officials manage ark 
manipulate information to gain power and profit fo 
themselves and for their patrons and allies. 
Therapy can take man}- forms. Among the more 
obvious is clear definition of people's rights togethe 
with multiple channel dissemination of information 
about those rights. The rights can concern, fo 
instance, access to supplies of new seeds, supplies o. 
irrigation water, physical on-farm conservation work-
according to farmers' plans and priorities, subsidized 
loans, or freedom to cut and transit trees, all of these 
without having to pay for them. The multiple channeb 
can include village meetings, handbills, notices 
broadcasts, videos and television broadcasts. The 
communications revolution of the 1990s will present 
new opportunities to inform people of their rights, and 
could be used to encourage them to organize, to resist 
extonion, and to make demands for their entitlements. 
Free communication about rights requires open 
government. It requires that Government circulars be 
made public. In India this has begun to happen, for 
example with a Government Order of 1 June 1990 
concerning involvement of village communities and 
voluntary agencies for regeneration of degraded forest 
lands, which was published in Wastelands Nevis, the 
widely circulated bulletin of the Society for the 
Promotion of Wastelands Development. 
Effective therapy can also occur through citizens 
themselves making information public. Sometimes 
corruption at the grassroots appears an ecological 
condition as unalterable as climate, a fact of life to be 
accepted. But at Ahmadpur in Latur District in India, a 
voluntary agency brought out a handbill which said: 
'Report a case of corruption and get the bribe-
money back.' 
Villagers met on an appointed day and testified to 
payments made. Officials were told that prosecution 
was not sought, only return of the money. The results 
reported were dramatic. Some officials asked for time 
to pay, but in all cases bribes were returned, the sums 
being designated as money that had been 'lent ' 
(Joshi 1989). 
In various ways, then, rights, information and 
communications can empower and enable individuals 
and organizations to make demands for good and 
honest service. The reversals implied will be resisted by 
those — mainly lower-level officials — who stand to 
lose. But the determination of policy and information 
resides higher up in the hierarchy; and there, in central 
administrative places, are to be found officials and 
political leaders whose behaviour is not fully 
determined, who do have room for manoeuvre, and 
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who do have power to modify and reform the system, 
especially through their use of communications, if they 
wish. 
Personal Reversals and Realism: Truth, Trust 
and Diversity 
' If they wish' is the crux. Therapy through reversals for 
diversity, and through rights, information and 
empowerment, can only occur through the behaviour 
of people. In the reform of any administrative culture, 
there are questions of who starts and where. The key 
people are those in a position to take and implement 
decisions. For those who work in large bureaucracies 
there are many obstacles to change on which much has 
been written. But the personal, psychological 
dimensions of these obstacles, and of the reversals to 
overcome them, have tended to be neglected. 
The first reversal concerns knowledge, and attitudes to 
information and error. The normal pathology of the 
self-deceiving state is mirrored by the normal 
pathology of self-deceiving individuals and professions. 
Even psychotherapists themselves lack feedback on the 
effectiveness of their work and are said not to seem 
interested in it (Howarth 1989). ' I would rather not 
know' captures a common attitude of prudent self-
defence among those with responsibility for actions and 
programmes who know or suspect that appearances are 
false. T o turn the blind eye, to avoid facing awkward 
facts, to bury error, and to believe against the evidence 
that what one is doing is good, these are common 
failings in the human condition. The challenge is to 
abandon concealment, to be open about error, and to 
want to face factual reality. The reversal is to seek, and 
be honest about, the t ruth. 
The second reversal concerns the common admini-
strative reflex of control, and the drive to control more 
rather than less. In March 1992, a group of Indian 
administrators were asked what would be the basic 
minimum to be standardized and regulated in setting 
up village-level savings and credit societies. Their 
collective list included rates of saving, application 
forms, eligibility, purposes of loans, rates of interest, 
repayments, penalties for default, and credit ratios. In 
contrast, the programme of over 1,600 savings and 
credit societies spread and supervised by M Y R A D A , 
an N G O in South India, entrusted all these aspects to 
individual societies to decide, and limited control and 
supervision to accounts, records and bookkeeping. The 
members of the societies and their committees had 
discretion to meet their diverse needs in their own way, 
and each society made its own rules for loans, interest 
rates, penalties for defaulters, and so on. The challenge 
posed by this example is to see the minimum that does 
need to be controlled — the bookkeeping, and the 
wisdom and courage to control no more than that, for 
all else trusting people to make their own decisions. 
The reversal, in short, is to replace control with trust. 
The third reversal concerns standardization. To fit the 
diversity of social, economic and ecological conditions 
requires a decentralized plurality of organizations, 
services, activities and choices. But control centralizes 
and standardizes. Caution calls for care to guard against 
all imaginable error or deviation, and for uniform and 
universal regulations to prevent these. Local discretion 
is limited. The credit and savings societies need more 
choice of what to do and how to do it. T h e reversal here 
is to replace uniformity with diversity. 
These three reversals — concerning truth, trust and 
diversity — combine against the self-deceiving state. 
But officials trapped in hierarchy and a web of 
corruption and misinformation, can seem to have little 
incentive for change and little room for manoeuvre. 
And there are costs for them: truth embarrasses; trust 
weakens authority; diversity undermines control. And 
introduced together in a corrupt system, t ruth, trust 
and diversity reduce the incomes of officials and 
politicians. 
Practical Theory 
It is at this point that most academic analysts give up. 
But the same is not true of courageous officials who 
struggle to act as therapists f rom within. For them, 
there are no easy solutions, but two approaches can be 
proposed: working with allies; and direct personal field 
experience. 
Allies for those who want to change can be found both 
within and outside government organizations. Within 
government organizations, informal networks of the 
like-minded can support each other. Outside govern-
ment organizations, support can be found in NGOs , 
aid agencies and foundations, and among academics. 
N G O s can have several roles as allies, empowering 
local groups to make demands, training government 
staff, setting examples by implementing programmes 
for government, raising questions about corruption 
and low standards, exposing the misfit of government 
'Model Ts ' , and developing participatory approaches 
and methods and training and socializing government 
staff to use them. For their part , aid agencies and 
foundations can use the leverage of funding to back 
participatory programmes, innovations, training and 
the like. T h e Ford Foundation has shown the potential 
from professional interaction in support of bureaucratic 
reorientation, as in the now classic case of the National 
Irrigation Administration in the Philippines (Korten 
and Siy 1989; Bagadion and Korten 1991). There, the 
changes introduced and evolved touched many aspects 
of participation and management; and the key element, 
modestly underacknowledged in the literature, was the 
commitment, continuity and alliance over almost a 
decade of two professionals, one in the NIA, and one in 
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the Ford Foundat ion . As so of ten , the history of a 
success points to the pr imacy of the personal. 
T h e quest ion then becomes how to mult iply and 
s t rengthen personal commi tmen t . One promising 
answer is direct field experience for senior decision-
makers. Normal ly , the more senior a person becomes, 
the more removed he or she is f r o m rural realities 
( though this is less t rue in East Africa, where so many 
are fa rmers in their own right, than in most other 
regions). N e w oppor tuni t ies for direct interaction, 
wi thout the constraints of rural development tourism, 
are now accessible with the approach and methods of 
part icipatory rural appraisal (PRA) (see e.g. 
Mascarenhas e t a l 1991). In India , the 320-odd 
probat ioners for the Indian Administrat ive Service 
each year now use PRA methods in their village 
fieldwork. Elsewhere, a few senior officers have been 
on field camps organized by N G O s and have found it a 
revealing and rewarding experience. A wide repertoire 
of means for learning f rom rural people and about rural 
condit ions is now available. Besides requiring relatively 
brief periods in the field, using these techniques is also 
interest ing and enjoyable. T h e quest ions now are how 
well they can be used; how many can use them; and how 
well they can effect reversals, th rough learning f rom 
below, keeping up- to-da te with change, and being 
sensitive to diverse priorities, especially of those who 
are poorer . 
Ne i ther working with allies, nor using and spreading 
P R A , is an easy, quick or universal means to realism. 
N o r are these more than two out of many interventions 
which could be put forward, case by case, to reduce 
misleading positive feedback, to limit corrupt ion, and 
to diversify away f rom ' M o d e l T approaches. But they 
have the meri t of being strategies which more and mi 
senior officials could adopt if they wished. Almost 
have some scope for finding allies. Almost all have so; 
opportuni t ies for less rushed and more relaxed : 
part icipatory interactions in rural areas and with pi 
people. T o m m around whole bureaucracies, though 
a massive task requir ing sustained commi tnu 
repeated re inforcement , and many actions. T h e b 
approach is to start and learn by doing. It can be hof 
that the next decade will present more and m> 
examples of progress f rom which others can learn a 
draw encouragement . 
Finally, the most effective and lasting change will cot 
f rom combinat ions of pressures and people. T o ph;-
out Ford ism and self-deception in Governmi 
adminis t ra t ion is more difficult than in the privr 
sector. T h e sanction of the market is missing. C 
surrogate is political demand f rom below. This c 
provide direct negative feedback and force mi 
realism and diversity into government programmes. 
India, West Bengal stands out as an example whc 
political ideology commit ted to the poor, backed 
political organization at the grassroots, has led 
reforms which have largely eluded the rest of Ind. 
These have been based not just on a democra 
envi ronment , f r eedom of speech, the free flow 
information, bu t also on the commitment ar 
continuity of key officials and politicians. T: 
discipline which market forces exercise for the priva 
sector can be provided for the State both f rom outsu 
by popular organization and pressure, and f rom insic 
by the personal commi tment of powerful people. The; 
are then two therapies for the psychotic State 
patient: f rom outside and below, and form inside ar 
above. 
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